Abstract. We study the optimal output of a competitive firm under price uncertainty.
Introduction
In a seminal paper, Sandmo (1971) studied the optimal output of a risk-averse firm that faces uncertain prices. He showed that optimal output under uncertainty would be lower than under certainty in an equivalent case. Sandmo also showed that optimal output under uncertainty satisfied the expectation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) utility function maximization for risk averters.
Nonetheless, many studies have offered evidence of a violation of conventional expected utility theory. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found from their experiments that the theory of expectation utility maximization for risk averters is violated by the following effects/paradox: the certainty effect or common ratio effect, the 'Allais Paradox' or 'common consequences effect,' and the 'isolation effect.' Sometimes, risk aversion and risk loving are associated with problems involving increments/decrements of wealth. On the other hand, Loomes and Sugden (1982) and others showed that regret aversion is an alternative theory that not only explains the reflection effect and simultaneous gambling and insurance effects, but also predicts the behaviors of the above-mentioned effects. They also argued that such behavior can be defended as rational, and thus, regret theory is a theory of rational choice under uncertainty.
There are alternative proposals for utility functions other than risk aversion. In particular, in an influential work, Savage (1951) suggested that decision makers may consider the feeling of regret in their decision process, that is, the feeling of having made the wrong decision. The seminal papers by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) presented a formal analysis of regret theory. Sugden (1993) took an axiomatic approach whereas Quiggin (1994) extended the analysis to multiple choices. In their work, regret is defined as the disutility of not having chosen the ex-post optimal alternative.
In recent years, there has been a growing literature on firm behavior that, instead of assuming risk aversion, assumes that firms are regret-averse. For example, if the firm's prices turn out to be very high and sales turn out to be very good, firms might regret not producing more. Conversely, if prices turn out to be low and sales are poor, firms might regret over-producting. Paroush and Venezia's paper (1979) is the first that applied a regret-averse model to the competitive firm. By modifying Sandmo's model but considering a firm with a regret utility function, they derived the conditions under which the optimal output in this uncertain framework is lower than that under certainty in an equivalent case. However, their result depends on the relative importance of the regret term and the firm's profits.
On the other hand, many studies have obtained a more specific and tractable regretaverse function than the one used by Paroush and Venezia (1979) . One can find such a function in Braun and Muermann (2004) , Muermann et al. (2006) , Mulandzi et al. (2008) , Michenaud and Solnik (2008) , and others. For example, Muermann et al. (2006) used such a function to study the portfolio optimal allocation problem for a regret-averse investor that is confronted with a risky and a risk-free asset. Also, Mulandzi et al. (2008) studied the optimal allocation between loans and Treasuries for a regret-averse bank. Laciana and Weber (2008) estimated the set of parameter values that allow the regret function to be consistent with the common consequence effect.
By adopting the more specific and tractable regret-averse function, we extend the model developed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) to study the properties of firms' behavior when optimal output is obtained for the regret-averse competitive firm under price uncertainty. Our paper has contributed the following to the literature: First, our paper is the first to introduce the two-attribute regret-averse function to study the properties of cost and price when optimal output is reached for a regret-averse firm that faces uncertain prices. Second, using a two-attribute regret-averse function, we show that a firm would choose a smaller optimal output than under certainty. Third, we circumvent the limitation of using the model developed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) that the regret term in their model possesses the same regret even when the utility functions of the regret-averse firms on regret are different while our model enables different firms to possess different regrets if their utilities on the regret term are different. Four, our model not only represents the production theory for risk-averse competitive firms, it could also represent the theory for risk-averse competitive firms. Five, our model setting allows us to make comparative statics of the optimal output by varying the parameters of the regret terms. Six, readers may refer to our discussion in Section 2.4 for other advantages of using our model. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present our main results, then finish in Section 3 with concluding remarks.
The Theory
In this section we present the general framework of different models to obtain the properties of producing optimal output for competitive firms. To distinguish the well-known results in the literature from the ones derived in this paper, all cited results will be called Propositions and our derived results will be called Theorems.
The firm sells its output x at an uncertain price represented by a random variable P . We first assume that the objective of the firm is to maximize the expected utility of profits in which the firm's utility function, u, is assumed to be a concave, continuous, and twice differentiable function of profits such that
to reflect risk aversion.
The total cost function of the firm is
in which F is a fixed cost and C(x) is the variable cost function with C(0) = 0 and, for any x > 0, C (x) > 0 and C (x) > 0. The firm's profit function then becomes
where P is the price of output, assumed to be a random variable with density function f (p) and expected value E(P ) = µ. Thus, the firm's expected utility of profits is
where E is the expectation operator. The above notations and definitions will be used throughout this paper. Based on this model setting, we first discuss the theory under certainty in the next subsection.
The Theory Under Certainty
If there is no uncertainty, price is equal to µ; that is, P = µ, and, in this situation, we can view the price P as the random variable with degenerate distribution at µ. Since there is no uncertainty, the firm maximizes the following utility function of profits:
The first-order condition of (5) is:
Let x * = arg max x u Π(x) be the optimal output level that is the solution to the firstorder condition in (6). Then, we have
Since C (x) > 0 and u (x) < 0 under the assumption, the second-order condition of (5) satisfies:
From the first-and second-order conditions in (6) and (8), one could easily obtain the solution of optimal output x * . We summarize the result in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For any risk-averse firm with utility function u satisfying (1) that will
maximize the utility function u as shown in (5) and face a certain price P = µ, it will choose an optimal output x *
by setting x such that its marginal revenue (= P ) equals its marginal cost, C , such that
We will construct an example to illustrate this finding in Section 3.
The Theory Under Uncertainty for Risk-Averse Competitive Firms
We now discuss the theory of optimal output by adopting the theory under uncertainty for risk-averse competitive firms. This theory was developed by Baron (1970 ), Sandmo (1971 and others. In order to make the notations consistent with other sections in this paper, our notations may differ from those in Sandmo (1971) and others.
The utility function, u, of the firm is defined in (1) to reflect risk aversion. The total cost function of the firm is defined in (2), the firm's profit function is defined in (3), and the firm's expected utility of profits is defined in (4). In contract to the objective of the firm in the theory under certainty, the objective of the risk-averse competitive firm using the theory under uncertainty is to maximize the expected utility of profits such that
where Π is the firm's profit function defined in (3). The first-and second-order conditions of (10) for the risk-averse competitive firm using the theory under uncertainty are
These are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum expected utility of equation (10) to hold. Let x * be the optimal output level that is the solution to the first-order condition in (11). We re-write the result obtained by Sandmo (1971) in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For any risk-averse firm with utility function u satisfying (1) that will maximize the expectation of u as shown in (10) and face an uncertain price P , it will choose an optimal output x * characterized by marginal cost C that is less than the expected
We note that the optimal output x * obtained by Sandmo (1971) for the theory un-der uncertainty for risk-averse competitive firms as shown in (13) is different from that obtained by adopting the theory under certainty as shown in (7). In addition, Sandmo (1971) showed that at the optimum, the expected price must be larger than the average variable cost, so that the firm requires a positive expected profit in order to choose a positive output level; that is
2.3 The Theory Under Uncertainty for Regret-Averse Competitive Firms
We next discuss the model developed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) . In order to make the notations consistent with other sections in this paper, our notations may differ from those used by Paroush and Venezia (1979) . Define the regret function
where Π is the firm's profit function defined in (3) and the ex-post optimal profit, denoted by Π max , is the optimal profit if there is no price uncertainty.
Let u be the utility function of the firm in the theory under uncertainty for regretaverse competitive firms and a function of both profits Π(P, x) and regret
with u Π = ∂u/∂Π > 0 and u R = ∂u/∂R < 0 where Π(P, x) is defined in (3) and R (P, x) is defined in (15), respectively. The firm is assumed to maximize the expectation of u in
We note that the assumptions in the theory under uncertainty developed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) for regret-averse competitive firms are different from those in the theory under uncertainty for risk-averse competitive firms. The former assumes that firms maximize the expectation of u for both profits Π(P, x) and regret R(P, x) as shown in (17), whereas the latter assumes that firms maximize the expectation of u, which is a function only of profits Π as shown in (4).
Assuming the price follows
where
= 1, and E(P ) = µ, one could easily show that the covariance between P and (u Π − u R ) satisfies
where u Π and u R are defined in (16) and other terms are defined in (18). We modify the results from Paroush and Venezia (1979) to obtain the following proposition to state the relationships of price and cost when obtaining optimal output:
Proposition 3 For any regret-averse firm with utility function u defined in (16) that will maximize the expectation of u as shown in (17) and face an uncertain price P , it will choose an optimal output x * that satisfies the following condition for the expected price E(P ) and the marginal cost C :
where u Π and u R are defined as in (16) .
Proposition 3 tells us that Cov(P, u Π − u R ) could be zero and even negative. We also note that the optimal output x * obtained by adopting the theory under uncertainty for regret-averse competitive firms developed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) as shown in (20) is different from that obtained by using the theory under uncertainty for risk-averse competitive firms developed by Sandmo (1971) as shown in (13) and is different from that obtained by adopting the theory under certainty as shown in (7). We obtain the inference made from the theory under uncertainty for regret-averse competitive firms developed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) as stated in the following corollary:
Corollary 2.1 Under the conditions and assumptions stated in Proposition 3,
We note that the inference from Part 3 of Corollary 2.1 with E(P ) < C (x * ) usually does not happen in practice. Is this result realistic? Some economists may believe that this is a limitation of using the framework developed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) .
To circumvent this limitation, we introduce a more specific and tractable regret-averse function for regret-averse competitive firms as discussed in the next subsection.
The Theory Under Uncertainty for Regret-Averse Competitive Firms for a Tractable Regret-Averse Function
In this paper we extend Paroush and Venezia's work by assuming the following twoattribute regret-averse utility function u on the profits Π for the regret-averse firm: , is the optimal profit if there were no price uncertainty. We note that although our paper is the first to introduce the two-attribute regret-averse utility function u as defined in (21) g (x) > 0 indicates that the more pleasurable the consequence that might have been, the more regret and the less rejoicing will be experienced.
We further assume that the regret-averse firm obtains the optimal output x * by maximizing the following expected utility of profits and regret:
There are many advantages to using this modeling setting. For example, (1) this modeling setting covers both the theory for risk-averse competitive firms developed by Sandmo (1971) (16) while we consider the regret term to be
The problem of using (16) as the regret term is that all regret-averse firms possess the same regret as shown in (16) even when their utility functions on regret are different.
Nonetheless, we circumvent this limitation by using the regret term defined in (23), which enables different firms to possess different regrets if their utilities on the regret term are different. (3) Moreover, we introduce the regret-averse attribute, g, and the weight of the regret attribute, k, so that we can study the behavior of regret-averse competitive firms with different values of g and/or k: the higher the value of k and/or g , the stronger the attitude of regret. Nevertheless, the utility function u proposed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) could not be used to study the behavior of different types of regret-averse competitive firms. Thus, our regret-averse function defined in (21) is a more specific and tractable regret-averse function. (4) In our modeling setting, we allow random prices to be any random variable, whereas the form of P is fixed as displayed in (18) Before we further develop our model, we first solve the maximization problem in (22) to obtain its first-order condition such that
= 0 .
By the assumptions of k, g, v, and C, we obtain the second-order condition to be
. Thus, there is a unique global optimum,
Proposition 3 and Corollary 2.1 tell us that E(P ) could be less than C (x * ) if we apply the theory developed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) , which some economists believe is not reasonable. Thus, our first objective is to see whether the more specific and tractable regret-averse function stated in (21) could be used to circumvent the limitation. We find that our proposed regret-averse function stated in (21) could be used for this purpose as stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1 For any regret-averse firm with utility function u defined in (16) that will maximize the expectation of u as shown in (17) and face an uncertain price P , it will choose an optimal output x * such that the expected price, E(P ), exceeds the marginal costs, C (x * ) when producing x * ; that is,
In contrast with the work of Paroush and Venezia (1979) , if we adopt this specific two-attribute utility function, the firm would definitely choose an output smaller than that in the theory under certainty. This result is different from that obtained by Paroush and Venezia (1979) but is similar to that obtained by the theory of the risk-averse firm.
One question is whether this optimal output increases or decreases as the regret-averse attribute varies. One way to answer this question is to study the comparative statics of this optimal output when the regret parameter k changes, as we do in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.2 Under the conditions and assumptions stated in Theorem 2.1, we have
, then dx * dk ≤ 0, and
As we have shown in the above proposition optimal output can go either way when the second attribute varies. Importantly, this condition does not directly depend on the second attribute, which accounts for the feeling of regret. The intuition behind this result is as follows: By concavity of v, the sign of Cov [−P, v (Π(x * ))] is positive. It means that if the difference between the certain price and the marginal cost is large enough, then the regret factor would lower the optimal output. In this case, the regret factor amplifies the decline in the optimal product. For the second case, the analysis is the opposite.
Illustrations
We first construct an example to illustrate the finding of Proposition 1 to state the relationship between price and cost when attaining optimal output for a risk-averse firm in the theory under certainty as shown in the following:
and u(x) = √ x so that the firm maximizes:
in which µ = P . Its first-order condition is: We then continue from Example 3.1 to construct an example to illustrate the finding of Proposition 2 to state the relationship between price and cost when attaining optimal output for a risk-averse firm under the theory under uncertainty. Without loss of generality, we assume F = 0 as shown in the following:
, u(x) = √ x, and the price of output, P , to be a random variable with P = $50 and P = $10 of equal probability so that its expected value E(P ) = $30 and the firm maximizes:
Its first-order condition is:
Thus, the optimum is at x * = 8.33 when C (x * = 8.33) = 2 * 8.33 = 16.66 < 30 = E(P ).
Example 3.2 supports the finding in Proposition 2 that an optimal output x * characterized by marginal cost C (x * ) is less than the expected price E(P ).
We turn to constructing an example to illustrate both Proposition 3 and Corollary 2.1 that E(P ) could be less than C (x * ) based on the theory developed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) :
We define the utility function of the firm in the theory under uncertainty for regret-averse competitive firms developed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) to be a function of both profits Π(P, x) and regret R(P, x) such that
We note that this utility function satisfies all the assumptions required, for example, We turn to examine optimal output in the theory under uncertainty for regret-averse competitive firms developed by Paroush and Venezia (1979) . Under the assumption of utility function defined in (26) and that price follows the distribution defined in (27) , the firm will maximize:
Maximizing (28) yields x = 10.52, which is larger than that under the certainty theory:
At last, we construct the following example to illustrate Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 for the theory of the behavior of regret-averse firms developed in this paper:
, and P = 50 or P = 10 with equal probability. Under the theory developed in this paper, regret-averse firms will produce the optimal output by maximizing the following:
We have the following
• if k = 0.5, then x * = 8.83, and
The above findings show that (1) the optimal output under the regret-averse theory developed in this paper is still less than that under the certainty theory, in which we get x = 10.29, and (2) the optimal output varies when k changes. For example, from the above, we have dx * /dk > 0. We plot the expected utility of profits, E u (Π) , for k = 1 in the following: 4 Concluding Remarks Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and many others pointed out a number of cases in which commonly observed patterns of choice violate conventional expected utility axioms. These violations indicate that some important factors that affect many people's choices have been overlooked or mis-specified by the conventional expected-utility theory. This problem is also reflected in the theory of production under uncertainty. Paroush and Venezia (1979) improved the theory by introducing the regret function to production theory.
However, there are some limitations of the regret function they introduced. To circumvent their limitations, in this paper we introduce a more specific and tractable regretaverse function into the theory of production to anticipate feelings of regret and rejoicing.
Our approach offers an alternative model that takes those feelings into consideration.
This model yields a range of inferences in the theory of production consistent with the behavior of regret-averse managers. For instance, we have shown that a regret-averse firm with an uncertain output price would choose an optimal output that is smaller than under certainty. We have also shown that this optimal output could increase or decrease as the regret-averse attribute varies.
It is common in economic theory to assume that firms are risk-averse. However, this assumption may not always be correct either. Thus, in this paper we extend the theory to include firms that are regret-averse. One may think that firms may not be regret-averse.
In this situation, one could conduct experiments to test the behavior of firms (managers) to see whether they are risk-averse or regret-averse. If they are neither risk-averse or regret-averse, one could then extend the theory to cover other types of firm's behaviors.
For example, one could assume that firms are risk seekers Li and Wong, 1999; Wong, 2007) or that firms' utility functions could be S-shaped or reverse S-shaped (Wong and Chan, 2008; Fong, et al., 2008; Broll, et al., 2010; Egozcue, et al., 2011b) . One could also use the behavioral finance concept to make assumption about firms' behavior; see, for example, Matsumura, et al. and Lam, et al. (2010, 2012) . At last, we note that one could apply the theory developed in this paper to incorporate the riskregret idea to other theories in economics and finance like investment decision making, see, for example, Fong, et al. (2005) , Wong and Ma (2008 ), Bai, et al. (2009 ), Chan, et al. (2011 .
